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The Proper Use of the Declaration of






In 1936, the Pennsylvania Legislature, in response to federal in-
centives' and the economic uncertainties of the Great Depression,
enacted an unemployment compensation law, the general purpose of
which is to grant unemployment compensation to unemployed per-
sons.2 Section 3, the Declaration of Public Policy, of the Unemploy-
ment Compensation Law clearly manifests a legislative intent to pay
unemployment compensation only to those who are "unemployed
through no fault of their own.,,3
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1. These federal incentives were in Title IX of the Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1101 (1976). For a brief review of the federal incentives, see Haggart, Unemployment Com-
pensation During Labor Disputes, 37 NEB. L. REV. 668, 668-74 (1958); for a brief review of the
draft bills prepared by the Committee on Economic Security, see Shadur, Unemployment Ben-
fts and the "Labor Dispute" Disqualfication, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 294, 295 (1950).
2. The Unemployment Compensation Law of 1936, Pub. L. No. 2897 (1937), PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, § 752 (Purdon 1964).
3. Section 3 states as follows:
Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health,
morals, and welfare of the people of the Commonwealth. Involuntary unemploy-
ment and its resulting burden of indigency falls with crushing force upon the unem-
ployed worker, and ultimately upon the Commonwealth and its political subdivision
in the form of poor relief assistance. Security against unemployment and the spread
of indigency can best be provided by the systematic setting aside of financial reserves
to be used as compensation for loss of wages by employees during periods when they
become unemployed through no fault of their own. The principle of the accumula-
tion of financial reserves, the sharing of risks, and the payment of compensation with
In establishing qualifying and eligibility' standards, the legisla-
ture frequently has amended the Unemployment Compensation
Law.' These amendments reflect legislative and societal policy and
attitudes about the nature of unemployment compensation. For ex-
ample, Governor Scranton in 1964 proposed numerous amendments
to the law, and these amendments were characterized as part of a
"reform" bill6 or as part of a "ripper" bill7 depending upon philo-
sophical considerations.' Similarly, the 1980 amendments to the
Unemployment Compensation Law caused partisan divisions in the
respect to unemployment meets the need of protection against the hazards of unem-
ployment and indigency. The Legislature, therefore, declares that in its considered
judgment the public good and the general welfare of the citizens of this Common-
wealth require the exercise of the police powers of the Commonwealth in the enact-
ment of this act for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used
for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own.
Id
4. Section 401 of the Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 801 (Purdon 1964 and Supp. 1983)
is entitled "Qualifications Required to Secure Compensation." The qualification which has
produced the most litigation under Section 401 is Section 401(d) which requires a claimant to
be "able to work and available for suitable work."
Section 402 of the Law is entitled "Ineligibility for Compensation." Id § 802. The eligi-
bility requirements which have produced the most litigation are Section 402(b), "voluntarily
leaving work without cause of necessitous and compelling nature," Section 402(d), the labor
dispute section, see Reuben and Schuckers, The Labor Dispute Disqualocation of the Penn-
sylvania Unemployment Compensation Law, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 211 (1977)) and Section 402(e),
"discharge or temporary suspension from work for willful misconduct connected with his
work."
5. Sections 401 and 402 of the law have been amended over 20 times during the past 45
years. None of these amendments resulted in the division, turmoil and bitterness which ac-
companied the 1964 amendments to the Unemployment Compensation Law.
6. See Governor Scranton's Message to the Joint Session of the Legislature, which con-
vened on February I1, 1964. 1964 LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL-SENATE, Special Session, 3-6,
HOUSE, 4-6. The most articulate legislative speech in favor of the 1964 amendments was deliv-
ered by Representative K. B. Lee, the Republican majority leader, who denied that the bill was
a "ripper" bill. 1964 LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL-HOUSE, Special Session, 63-66.
7. The most articulate legislative speech opposing the 1964 amendments was delivered
by Representative H. Fineman of Philadelphia who characterized the bill as "ruination" and
as a "ripper" bill. 1964 LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL-HOUSE, Special Session, 75-85.
8. At the heart of these philosophical considerations is the question whether the pay-
ment of unemployment compensation is a disincentive to work. In the legislative debates of
1964, Senator Hawbaker of Franklin County stated:
The people who are unemployed today, because of changes in a local scene, are going
to have to borrow a page from their gallant ancestors and strike out on their own. Of
course, we are going to help them with a fine unemployment compensation program.
However, we cannot enact legislation that would inhibit initiative, to the extent that
people are not encouraged to strike out on their own.
1964 LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL-SENATE, Special Seseion, 121. Senator Staisey, Allegheny
County, presented the argument, inter alia, that unemployment compensation is an integral
part of a support system under the Social Security Act and that this support system is not a
disincentive to work. 1964 LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL-SENATE, Special Session, 103-110.
One commentator addressed the issue as follows: "[T]he price of social security is contin-
ual watchfulness that it should not be permitted to weaken that incentive [to find paid employ-
ment]. Part of that watchfulness must be in the form of civic education that teaches the
citizen's duty to cooperate in making a productive society." See R. ALTMAN, AVAILABILITY
FOR WORK: A STUDY IN UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 19 (1950). But see Feldstein, Un-
employment Compensation.- Adverse Incentives and Distributional Anomalies, 27 NAT'L TAX J.
231, 243 (1974) in which the author argues that "the current system of unemployment compen-
sation entails very strong adverse incentives" and that the adverse incentives could be reduced
by "including unemployment compensation in taxable income."
legislature.' Such debates and clashing views about amendments to
the Unemployment Compensation Law are foreseeable and un-
doubtedly will recur in the future.
Although the legislature frequently has amended the qualifying
and eligibility standards of the Unemployment Compensation Law,
the Legislature has never amended Section 3. Section 3, however,
has been reviewed increasingly by the courts and has become a sub-
ject of judicial dispute. This dispute, like the legislative debates, in-
volves philosophical considerations about the nature of
unemployment compensation.
Section 3 traditionally has been used by the courts as an inter-
pretive provision.'° This use is consistent with the principle of statu-
tory construction that "the preamble of a statute may be considered
in the construction thereof.""
In the past twenty years, however, the courts have used Section
3 as more than an interpretive section. In 1965, in the Lybarger Un-
employment Compensation Case, 2 which involved a collective bar-
gaining agreement that included a "Share the Work"- plan, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that Section 3 "is not merely a
perfunctory preface but is, rather, the keystone upon which the en-
tire Act rests."' 3 In 1975, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court in
Budzanoski v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review' 4 and
in Ostrander v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review ' 5 uti-
lized Section 3 as a substantive section while reviewing unemploy-
ment caused by off-duty behavior.
New circumstances of the 1960s and 1970s, totally unforeseen in
1936, caused the courts' use of Section 3 to expand to more than an
interpretive use.' 6 The unforeseen circumstance of the 1960s was the
9. The partisan division was particularly evident in the House of Representatives; one
member, Representative Spencer (Republican, Tioga County), who had been a member of the
House in 1964, noted "a little bit of a sense of deja Pu" when considering the 1980 amendments
to the Unemployment Compensation Law. 1980 LEGISlATIvE JOURNAL-HOUSE 2035.
10. See, e.g., Penn Hills School District v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Re-
view, 496 Pa. 620, 437 A.2d 1213 (1981); Gianfelice Unemployment Compensation Case, 396
Pa. 545, 153 A.2d 906 (1959); Sturdevant Unemployment Compensation Case, 158 Pa. Super.
548, 45 A.2d 898 (1946).
11. See I PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 1924 (Purdon Supp. 1983).
12. 418 Pa. 471, 211 A.2d 463 (1965).
13. Id at 476, 211 A.2d at 466.
14. 21 Pa. Commw. 535, 346 A.2d 864 (1975).
15. 21 Pa. Commw. 583, 347 A.2d 351 (1975).
16. See Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 400-01 (1950) in which the
author stated:
increasingly as a statute gains in age - its language is called upon to deal with cir-
cumstances utterly uncontemplated at the time of its passage. Here the quest is not
properly for the sense originally intended by the statute, for the sense sought origi-
nally to be put into it, but rather for the sense which can be quarried out of it in the
light of the new situation. Broad purposes can indeed reach far beyond details
known or knowable at the time of drafting. A "dangerous weapon" statute of 1840
development of a "Share the Work" plan which was part of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement and which involved "planned unemploy-
ment." The unforeseen circumstance of the 1970s was the arrival of
assertive, litigious claimants who were more demanding of the un-
employment compensation system and were more willing to assert
their rights within that system.'
7
II. Section 3 and "Share the Work" Plans
One of the most complex unemployment compensation
problems in Pennsylvania arises when the employer and the em-
ployee's collective bargaining agent enter into a contract which
raises the question whether the employee's subsequent unemploy-
ment, pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, is through no
fault of his own. This problem has been analyzed within the context
of the voluntary-involuntary distinction of Section 402(b) of the
Law,' 8 the availability-for-suitable-work requirement of Section
401(d) of the Law' 9 and the "no fault of their own" provision of
Section 3 of the Law.
20
In the leading case, Gianfelice Unemployment Compensation
Case,2' the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the superior
court22 and granted benefits to the claimant, Gianfelice, who had
can include tommy guns, tear gas or atomic bombs. "Vehicle," in a statute of 1840
can properly be read, when sense so suggests, to include an automobile, or a hydro-
plane that lacks wheels. But for all that, the sound quest does not run primarily in
terms of historical intent. It runs in terms of what the words can be made to bear, in
making sense in the light of the unforeseen.
17. Most claimants who challenged the use of Section 3 as a substantive section in the
1970s were represented by attorneys from Legal Services. These attorneys usually relied upon
the principle of statutory construction that a preamble can be utilized as an interpretive section
and upon the analysis, best summarized by Judge Reno as follows:
The Unemployment Compenation Law is remedial, humanitarian legislation of
vast import. Its benefits sections must be liberally and broadly construed. It is pri-
marily intended for the benefit of unemployed workers. Consequently, the cardinal
principle under which the act is administered is that an employe in covered employ-
ment can be denied its benefits only by explicit language in the act which clearly and
plainly excludes him. Presumably, an unemployed worker in a covered employment
is entitled to benefits, and loses them only when he falls under the condemnation of a
disqualifying provision of the act, fairly, liberally and broadly interpreted.
Sturdevant Unemployment Compensation Case, 158 Pa. Super. 548, 559-60, 45 A.2d 898, 904
(1946). See also Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Ca-
nons About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950) for the proposition
that for every canon of statutory construction there is an opposite and equal canon of statutory
construction. For example, Llewellyn cited the canon, "a statute cannot go beyond its text,"
beside the canon "to effect its purpose a statute may be implemented beyond its text." Id at
401. Similarly, he cited the canon, "preambles do not expand scope," beside the canon, "pre-
ambles may be consulted to determine rationale, and thus the true construction of terms." Id
at 403.
18. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 802(b) (Purdon Supp. 1983).
19. Id § 801(b).
20. Id § 752.
21. 396 Pa. 545, 153 A.2d 906 (1959).
22. 186 Pa. Super. 186, 142 A.2d 739 (1958). Before 1970, unemployment compensation
cases were appealed from the Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Board of Review to
the Pennsylvania Superior Court and then, upon an application for allocatur, to the Penn-
been retired at age 68 pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement
but who "personally wished to continue in his work."23 The
supreme court enunciated the following much-cited test:
This is one reason why the collective bargaining agreement
should not control in determining the eligibility of a retired gm-
ployee for unemployment compensation; rather, thefactual matrix
at the time of separation should govern . . . .Viewed in this light,
the questions here become simply (1) did Gianfelice cease work-
ing voluntarily as a matter of fact, and (2) was Gianfelice avail-
able for work thereafter? Since the answers on the record are
(1) no and (2) yes, Gianfelice is entitled to benefits.
24
The supreme court determined that the claimant involuntarily was
unemployed25 and that the claimant was available for suitable
work26 and thus granted benefits to the claimant. The court sup-
ported its decision by reference to Section 3 and included in its deci-
sion making process an analysis of the voluntary-involuntary
distinction, an analysis of the availability-for-suitable-work require-
ment and an analysis of the public policy that is fundamental to un-
employment compensation, "to alleviate the hardships attendant
upon unemployment" by compensating those who are unemployed
"through no fault of their own."
27
The supreme court, after analyzing Section 70128 of the Unem-
ployment Compensation Law and several federal court decisions,
continued: "Where a statute of the Commonwealth expresses a pub-
lic policy designed to alleviate a condition of possible distress among
the public or a segment thereof and explicitly proscribes waiver of the
benefits of the act, no private agreement, however valid between the
parties, can operate as such a waiver."29 Thus, the supreme court in
sylvania Supreme Court. Jurisdiction over appeals was transferred from the superior court to
the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court by the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act of 1970, with
the right of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court by petition remaining unchanged. See
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 763 (Purdon 1981).
23. 396 Pa. at 548-49, 153 A.2d at 908.
24. Id at 552, 153 A.2d at 909-10.
25. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 802(b) (Purdon Supp. 1983).
26. Id § 801(b).
27. "The Unemployment Compensation Law was enacted to alleviate the hardships at-
tendant upon unemployment. . . .It is a remedial statute designed to provide support for
workers who are unemployed exceptfor those disqual#Fed by one of the specific provisions of
§ 402." 396 Pa. at 552, 153 A.2d at 910 (emphasis supplied).
28. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 861 (Purdon 1964) which states as follows: "No agreement
by an employe to waive, release, or commute his rights to compensation, or any other rights
under this act, shall be valid."
29. 396 Pa. at 554, 153 A.2d at 911. The supreme court in dictum also stated that the
parties cannot agree to allow an employee-claimant to receive unemployment compensation:
"The opposite principle-that employer and employee cannot agree that the latter receive ben-
efits when the law precludes such benefits--has been stated with finality by the Superior
Court." Id
The supreme court cited Gagliardi Unemployment Compensation Case, 186 Pa. Super.
142, 141 A.2d 410 (1958), for this proposition. Therein the superior court outlined a problem
which has occasionally risen in unemployment compensation cases, an agreement between the
parties which provides for the payment of unemployment compensation to an employee-
Gianfelice seemingly answered the question whether parties contrac-
tually could alter an employee-claimant's eligibility for unemploy-
ment compensation: the answer was that they could not.
Six years later, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had the oppor-
tunity to reevaluate its position and to reconsider the legislature's
declaration of public policy in Section 3 of the Unemployment Com-
pensation Law. In Lybarger Unemployment Compensation Case,3 °
an employee-claimant was unemployed from early October 1961 to
January 1, 1962, because his collective bargaining agreement re-
quired the layoff of employees whose gross income equalled $5000
for the year.3' The employee-claimant reached the $5000 wage limi-
tation in early October, 1961 and was laid off pursuant to the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. The supreme court affirmed a denial of
unemployment compensation benefits to the employee-claimant.
The court specifically utilized Section 402(b) of the Law, 32 the
voluntary quit section, to deny benefits, but the underlying rationale
was the public policy declaration of Section 3. In language which
very nearly approved use of Section 3 as a substantive section, the
supreme court stated:
In arriving at our determination of these appeals, we are
aided considerably by the guidelines set forth in the Legislature's
declaration of public policy found in § 3 of the Act. That section
is not merely a perfunctory preface but is, rather, the keystone
upon which the entire Act rests and the basis upon which the indi-
vidual sections of the Act must be interpreted and construed.
More particularly, the relationship between § 3 and § 402(b)(1) is
close and complementary, calling for the construction of
§ 402(b)(1) in the light of the fuller, more comprehensive, and
more explicit language of § 3.33
The court was troubled because the employee-claimant's unemploy-
ment resulted from a "program of planned unemployment, ' 34 from
"unemployment arranged, agreed upon, and sanctioned by the em-
ployer and employee,"'3" from "unemployment continuously and de-
claimant. Judge Woodside stated that "the interest of the Commonwealth and the vast body
of covered employees in the solvency of the fund is sometimes forgotten [and] it is the duty of
the [Unemployment Compensation Board of Review] to develop all the relevant facts." Id. at
153, 141 A.2d at 416. The implementation of such a requirement in the face of resistance or
even collusion by an employee and an employer is extremely difficult.
30. 418 Pa. 471, 211 A.2d 463 (1965).
31. Specifically the agreement provided:
Employees with sufficient seniority to remain at work shall be kept as operators
until the pay period when their gross earnings received from the Company since
January amount to five thousand dollars. . . plus or minus fifty dollars. . . .Such
operators will then go on layoff for the remainder of the year or until all younger
operators have been recalled, and additional ones are required in seniority order.
Id at 474, 211 A.2d at 464.
32. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 802(b) (Purdon Supp. 1983).
33. 418 Pa. at 477, 211 A.2d at 465-66.
34. Id at 477, 211 A.2d at 466.
35. Id at 478, 211 A.2d at 466-67.
liberately planned and created by the contract arrangement," 36 from
"a planned, intentional system of unemployment devised for the
purpose of seeking to create eligibility for benefits from the unem-
ployment compensation fund. 37
The unemployment in Lybarger clearly was planned and was
pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement negotiated on behalf
of the employee-claimant by his union representatives.3 8 The
planned unemployment in Lybarger, however, should be compensa-
ble under the tests enunciated in Gianfelice." (1) did Lybarger cease
working voluntarily as a matter of fact; and (2) was Lybarger avail-
able for work thereafter? The answers in Lybarger are the same as
in Gianfelice, and thus the employee claimant in Lybarger should
have been granted benefits.39
Justice Cohen's vigorous dissent in Lybarger raised several
questions. First, did the supreme court in Lybarger overrule Gi-
anfelice, sub silentio?a° Justice Cohen stated that Lybarger did over-
rule Gianfelice, and the logic of his conclusion is difficult to refute.
Second, did the supreme court in Lybarger resurrect for unem-
ployment compensation purposes the agency theory of the union-
employee relationship" t which had been rejected in Gianfelice?
Once again, Justice Cohen believed it did, and any other conclusion
defies logic.
The dissent posed a third question fraught with social, economic
and philosophical overtones: why should the unemployment com-
pensation system, including the judicial system, disapprove of a
36. Id at 478, 211 A,2d at 467.
37. Id at 480, 211 A.2d at 468.
38. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Gianfelice specifically rejected the theory that a
union member is bound by his union's collective bargaining agreement for unemployment
compensation purposes. See supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text.
39. The supreme court's attempt to distinguish factually Gianfelice from Lybarger is not
convincing. See 418 Pa. at 479-82, 211 A.2d at 467-68. The use of Section 3 as more than an
interpretive section distinguishes Lybarger from Gianfelice. The question then is, however,
whether Gianfelice's unemployment was arranged, agreed upon, deliberately planned and
sanctioned by the employer and employee. Clearly it was.
40. See 418 Pa. at 497, 211 A.2d at 476 (Cohen, J., dissenting); see also Note, Unemploy-
ment Compensation - Employees Mandatorily Retired Pursuant to Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment Not Entitled to Unemployment Benefits, 44 VA. L. REv. 1343, 1346 (1958), in which the
author stated:
The holding in each case seems to be governed by whether the courts and agen-
cies have used a subjective or objective approach. Those favoring the subjective
method base their decisions on a preference for the individual's volition unaffected
by a collective bargaining agreement, and attempt to balance the equities in each
situation; they justify this view by finding it to be consonant with legislative intent.
See also Annot., 50 A.L.R.3d 880 (1973) for an explanation of the distinction between the
subjective and objective approaches. Gianfelice represents the subjective approach, while
Lybarger represents the objective approach.
41. The Gianfelice court expressly rejected the agency theory of the union-employee rela-
tionship which is found in Prentice Unemployment Compensation Case, 161 Pa. Super. 630,
56 A.2d 295 (1948). For an analysis of the agency theory in the context of Section 402(d) of the
Law, see Reuben and Schuckers, 7he Labor Dispute Disqualoication of the Pennsylvania Unem-
ployment Compensation Law, 50 TEMP. L.Q. 211, 244-46 (1977).
"Spread the Work" or a "Share the Work" agreement? Justice Co-
hen answered that "Spread the Work" agreements are beneficial for
society and should be encouraged. 2
In 1980 the legislature and the commonwealth court impliedly
accepted Justice Cohen's position and allowed for "Share the Work"
or "Spread the Work" plans within the context of the Unemploy-
ment Compensation Law. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
affirmed the grant of benefits to the employee-claimants in United
States Steel Corporation v. Unemployment Compensation Board of
Review.4 3  The employee-claimants had accumulated numerous
years of service and remained unemployed under a very complex
collective bargaining agreement. The agreement allowed for "re-
verse seniority"; the company recalled employees with less seniority
before recalling employees with more seniority. The court rejected
the employer's availability-for-suitable-work argument under Sec-
tion 401(d) of the Law and stated: "The reverse seniority aspects of
the agreement here do not limit availability for work any more than
a regular seniority agreement can be said to limit the availability of
junior employees for work when there are not enough job openings
to permit the recall of all employees." 44 The commonwealth court
42. 418 Pa. at 502-03, 211 A.2d at 478-79 (emphasis in original). Justice Cohen stated as
follows:
The employer could only use a certain number of employees in his business.
The number of persons available and unemployed who could perform the job was
greater than the number the employer could use. In order to give more persons an
opportunity to work during the year no person was allowed to work after his earnings
reached $5,000. In other words, the employer and union agreed to "spread the
work." In the anthracite coal industry the work is spread on a time, rather than
dollar, basis, the employees working alternate months. In other industries the retire-
ment age is set with an eye to making room for new employees as well as an eye
toward the age at which an employee loses his effectiveness.. (None of these provi-
sions for "spreading the work" involve "feather-bedding" which is having more men
employed at any one time than are needed to do the job.) "Spreading the work" in
no way creates unemployment. Viewed in terms of unemployed man hours it neither
increases nor decreases unemployment. All it does is to allow more persons to work
over a period of time. Rather than having 50 men continuously employed and 50
men continuously unemployed all 100 men work part of the time and are unem-
ployed part of the time.
Far from attributing to the employees some sort of "fault," as the majority does,
it seems commendable that more people are given a chance to work in a society
which values work as highly as ours does. Surely the majority does not believe it is
the employee's "fault" that all the available man hours cannot be absorbed by the
economy. What the majority fails to recognize is that the 'spread the work' doctrine
is an attempt to cope with the sad fact of unemployed man hours - a fact not attrib-
utable to any "fault" on the part of the employees.
If 100 men who are employed part of the time and unemployed the other part of
the time place more of a strain on the unemployment compensation fund than 50
men who are employed continuously and 50 men who are unemployed continuously
then the Legislature must change the law. But, as it now stands, the law merely
requires that the employee who was "layed off" desired, at the time of the layoff, to
continue working and that he be available for suitable work but unable to obtain it.
43. 52 Pa. Commw. 631, 417 A.2d 266 (1980).
44. Id at 636, 417 A.2d at 268. The commonwealth court recognized that seniority
agreements, like "Share the Work" Plans, do not create unemployment:
there is and can be no dispute that if enough labor pool jobs had been available to
distinguished Lybarger45 and specifically relied upon the "factual
matrix at the time of separation" test enunciated in Gianfelice.
The day before the commonwealth court decision in United
States Steel, the Governor signed H.B. 167346 (Act 108) which effec-
tively overruled the analysis in Lybarger and reaffirmed the Gi-
anfelice test. Act 108 contains three separate but similar provisions
which deal with unemployment resulting from a collective bargain-
ing agreement: (1) Section 401(d), the availability-for-suitable-work
section, was amended to include the following provision:
No otherwise eligible claimant shall be denied benefits for
any week in which his unemployment is due to exercising the op-
tion of accepting a layoff, from an available position, pursuant to
a labor-management contract, or pursuant to an established em-
ployer plan, program or policy.
47
(2) Section 402(a), the refusal-to-accept-suitable-work section, was
amended to include the following provision:
[Hiowever, this subsection shall not cause a disqualification
of a waiting week or benefits under the following circumstances:
when work is offered by his employer and he is not required to
accept the offer pursuant to the terms of the labor-management
contract or agreement, or pursuant to an established employer
plan, program or policy.
48
(3) Section 402(b), the voluntary quit section, was amended to in-
clude the following provision:
Provided further, that no otherwise eligible claimant shall be
denied benefits for any week in which his unemployment is due to
exercising the option of accepting a layoff, from an available posi-
tion pursuant to a labor-management contract agreement, or pur-
suant to an established employer plan, program or policy.
49
Act 108 precludes the denial of unemployment compensation in
Pennsylvania if the employee-claimant's unemployment was the re-
sult of a "Share the Work" or "Spread the Work" provision of a
collective bargaining agreement. 50
Although the dissenting view in Lybarger has prevailed, the leg-
permit the recall of all laid-off skilled employees, the employer, by following the
usual procedure, would have gotten down to the claimants in question and, without
any violation of the agreements or past practice, been able to make the specific job
offers to the specific claimants, who, it is acknowledged, declared themselves willing
to accept such offers.
Id
Similarly, mandatory retirement plans, like the one in Gianfelice, do not create unemployment.
Both seniority agreements and retirement plans involve principles of work sharing where there
is a surplus of labor.
45. Mysteriously and apparently inadvertently, the commonwealth court distinguished
the superior court's decision in Lybarger and not the supreme court's decision.
46. Act No. 108 of 1980, signed July 10, 1980.
47. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 801(d) (Purdon Supp. 1983).
48. Id. § 802(a).
49. Id § 802(b).
50. Although the declaration of public policy of the Unemployment Compensation Law
was not amended by Act 108, it is difficult to envision the use of Section 3 as a substantive
islature now must consider additional amendments to the Unem-
ployment Compensation Law to deal with another problem
discussed by Justice Cohen - funding!5' Foreseeably, employers
and unions more frequently will negotiate a provision of a collective
bargaining agreement which would require an employee to accept a
layoff in a "Share the Work" program. If an employer already is
paying the maximum unemployment tax (10.15 percent of the first
$8000 paid to an employee during the calendar year 1984)52 the em-
ployer easily could afford to include in the collective bargaining
agreement a Lybarger type "Share the Work" provision. This provi-
sion would be at no additional immediate cost to the employer and
would be very attractive to a union, particularly if its members re-
cently had been laid off in significant numbers. Such a provision
would not create unemployment, but would be "an attempt to cope
with the sad fact of unemployed man hours - a fact not attributable
to any 'fault' on the part of the employees.
53
No additional cost would be borne by the employer who al-
ready is paying the maximum unemployment tax. Through the
State Adjustment Factor,54 other covered employers in Pennsylvania
would shoulder the burden of the additional cost.55 The resulting
strain on the Unemployment Compensation Fund may require legis-
lative action.56 The legislature enacted Act 108 and thereby over-
ruled the Lybarger analysis and precluded use of Section 3 as a
substantive section in cases involving "Share the Work" plans. The
legislature now should consider amending57 the Unemployment
Compensation Law to allow payment of compensation under sophis-
ticated "Share the Work" programs.5 8 A legislative change, how-
ever, should and must address the funding question.59
section to deny benefits under a "Share the Work" plan in light of the clear expression of
legislative intent in Act 108.
51. See also Judge Woodside's concerns for the funding and solvency of the Unemploy-
ment Compensation Fund in Gagliardi Unemployment Compensation Case, 186 Pa. Super.
142, 141 A.2d 410 (1958). On January 31, 1983, Pennsylvania owed the federal government
$2.3 billion for the payment of unemployment compensation in Pennsylvania.
52. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 753(x)(1), 781(a)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1983).
53. 418 Pa. at 502-03, 211 A.2d at 479 (Cohen, J., dissenting).
54. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 781.1(a), (e) (Purdon Supp. 1983).
55. An employer's contribution rate is determined by three factors: (i) a funding factor;
(2) an experience factor; and (3) a state adjustment factor. Id. § 781.1(a).
56. See Lybarger, 418 Pa. at 497, 211 A.2d at 476 (Cohen, J., dissenting).
57. The legislature should amend the definition of "unemployed," which presently does
not include unemployment compensation for daily participants in a "Share the Work" pro-
gram. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 753(u) (Purdon 1964).
58. For an excellent introduction to the advantages and disadvantages of "Share the
Work" programs and their unemployment compensation implications, see Crosslin, Shared-
Work Compensation As Part of a Temporary Worksharing Program, Unemployment Compen-
sation: Studies and Research - National Commission on Unemployment Compensation,
827-31 (1980).
59. See id at 829 for a brief analysis of the California experience with "Share the Work"
programs under the California unemployment compensation system. Crosslin specifically
III. Section 3 and Off-Duty Behavior
Although the legislature has rejected Lybarger and the use of
Section 3 in the context of "Share the Work" plans, Section 3 has
been increasingly used during the past decade by unemployment
compensation authorities and by courts60 in the context of off-duty
behavior. Claimants who have been discharged for off-duty behav-
ior usually have not been ruled ineligible under the "willful miscon-
duct" section of the Law.6' The "willful misconduct" standard
usually has been applied only to on-duty behavior, behavior directly
connected with the claimant's work.62 These claimants also have not
been ruled ineligible under the "voluntary-quit" section of the
Law. 63 Their unemployment is involuntary because they desired to
remain employed.' Courts and unemployment compensation au-
thorities increasingly have used Section 3 to deny benefits to these
claimants.65
The off-duty behavior to which Section 3 has been applied as a
substantive section66 can be categorized as follows: (1) Off-duty con-
noted that: "Firms [which participated in the program] with a negative balance on their expe-
rience-rated reserve account must pay an additional surcharge to participate in the program."
Such a provision is a possible answer to the funding question.
60. Pursuant to Sections 501-512 of the Unemployment Compensation Law, the initial
determination of a claim is made by the Office of Employment Security which has over 100
offices in Pennsylvania. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 821-32 (Purdon 1964 & Supp. (1983). An
appeal can then be made to an unemployment compensation referee of which there are ap-
proximately 40. From the referee's decision an appeal can be made to the Unemployment
Compensation Board of Review which consists of three members and sits in Harrisburg. Ap-
peals from Board decis'ons are to the commonwealth court. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 769
(Purdon 1981).
61. Section 402(e) of the Law states as follows: "An employee shall be ineligible for
compensation for any week. . . in which his unemployment is due to his discharge or tempo-
rary suspension from work for willful misconduct connected with his work... " PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, § 802(e) (Purdon 1964). If, however, an employee willfully violates an employer's
regulation concerning off-duty conduct, Section 402(e) applies and benefits will be denied if
the regulation reasonably relates to the employer's interest.
62. See Gallagher v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 36 Pa. Commw.
599, 388 A.2d 785 (1978). Therein benefits were granted to a claimant who had been dis-
charged for calling, while off-duty, his employer's girlfriend an obscene name. The court rea-
soned that the conduct was not work connected.
63. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 802(b) (Purdon Supp. 1983).
64. For an excellent discussion of the "voluntary" and "involuntary" distinction within
the context of Pennsylvania's Unemployment Compensation Law, see Sturdevant Unemploy-
ment Compensation Case, 158 Pa. Super. 548, 45 A.2d 898 (1946).
65. Unemployment compensation authorities and courts have not applied Section 3 to an
employee's off-duty violation of an employer's regulation. Such cases properly are determined
by Section 402(e). Nevel v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 32 Pa. Commw.
6, 377 A.2d 1045 (1977). For an analysis of this type of case, see Gregory v. Anderson, 14 Wis.
2d 130, 109 N.W.2d 675 (1961). Gregory v. Anderson is criticized in Note, Unemployment Com-
pensation - Misconduct - Disqualgfcation for Violation of an Off-Duty Regulation, 1962 Wis. L.
REV. 392.
66. On January 18, 1980, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated: "After a studied con-
sideration of the records, together with the briefs and arguments of counsel, we find nothing
sufficiently persuasive to cause us to disturb the orders of the Commonwealth Court in these
cases." Smith v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 487 Pa. 448, 450, 409 A.2d
854, 854-55 (1980) (per curiam). At issue were seven cases in which the commonwealth court
had affirmed the denial of benefits under Section 3.
duct which precludes the employee from performing normal job du-
ties; (2) off-duty conduct which requires an employer to discharge
the employee; and the off-duty conduct which results in an arrest or
conviction. Each type of Section 3 case requires a distinct analytical
approach.
A. Preclusion from Performing Normal Job Duties
Section 3 is most commonly used as a substantive section when
the claimant, usually a truck driver, has had his driver's license sus-
pended for off-duty conduct and subsequently is suspended or dis-
charged by his employer. The commonwealth court has affirmed the
denial of benefits under Section 3 to a truck driver whose license was
suspended when he failed to satisfy a judgment obtained by a third
party in an unrelated civil action,67 to a truck driver whose license
was suspended when he failed to pay a judgment arising out of an
automobile accident,68 to truck drivers whose licenses were sus-
pended for driving while under the influence of alcohol (but not on
company time),69 and to a "casual" mail carrier for the U.S. Postal
Service whose federal driver's license was suspended after three au-
tomobile accidents involving Postal Services vehicles which he was
driving.7"
Each of these individuals was employed in a position a prereq-
uisite of which was a valid driver's license, each individual knew of
the prerequisite, and despite such knowledge each engaged in off-
duty conduct that resulted in license suspension and subsequent un-
employment. Although the denial of benefits in such cases is
sound,7 the denial should not have been premised on Section 3.
67. Strokes v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 29 Pa. Commw. 584, 372
A.2d 485 (1977), aff'dper curiam, 487 Pa. 448, 409 A.2d 854 (1980). The commonwealth court
rejected several arguments advanced by the claimant including the argument that the term
"through no fault of their own" is unconstitutionally vague.
68. Collins v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 39 Pa. Commw. 389, 395
A.2d 667 (1978), afl'dper curiam, 487 Pa. 448, 409 A.2d 854 (1980).
69. Bechtel v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 46 Pa. Commw. 458, 405
A.2d 1074 (1979); Huff v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 40 Pa. Commw. 11,
396 A.2d 94 (1979), aq'dper curiam, 487 Pa. 448, 409 A.2d 854 (1980).
70. Varmecky v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 60 Pa. Comnw. 640,
432 A.2d 635 (1981). The Office of Employment Security granted benefits in this case, the
referee denied benefits under Section 3, and the Board denied benefits under Section 402(e),
the "willful misconduct connected with his work" standard. The claimant's accidents were all
work-related, so his eligibility should have been determined under Section 402(e). The com-
monwealth court, however, has been inconsistent in its analysis under Section 402(e) of cases
usually involving truck drivers who were discharged after accidents. See Trout v. Unemploy-
ment Compensation Board of Review, 65 Pa. Commw. 477, 442 A.2d 1209 (1982) (denial of
benefits after three negligent accidents in less than a year); Parke v. Unemployment Compen-
sation Board of Review, 38 Pa. Commw. 382, 393 A.2d 62 (1978) (award of benefits to a
claimant who was discharged after his involvement in what his employer characterized as five
"preventable" accidents within 16 months).
71. A completely different analysis and result are evident in Przekaza v. Department of
Employment Security, 136 Vt. 355, 392 A.2d 421 (1978), in which the Vermont Supreme Court
The courts should have used Section 402(e) and the "willful miscon-
duct connected with his work" standard. The individuals' off-duty
conduct was connected with their work7 2 because it prevented them
from fulfilling one of the prerequisites of their employment."
Section 3 has also been used as a substantive section in alcoholic
absenteeism cases. The commonwealth court has affirmed the denial
of benefits under Section 3 to an individual who, on a weekend, fell
into an "alcoholic stupor," failed. to report to work during the entire
following week and subsequently was discharged7 4 and to an indi-
vidual who had a history of drinking, had been warned about exces-
sive absenteeism, continued to be repeatedly absent due to
alcoholism and subsequently was discharged.75 In both cases, the
court rejected the argument that alcoholism is a disease over which
an individual has little or no control and that any "willfulness"
under Section 402(e) or "fault" under Section 3 is thereby negated.
Each of these individuals knew that one of the prerequisites of
employment was continued attendance. Despite this knowledge
each engaged in off-duty conduct which caused his continued ab-
sence from work and subsequent unemployment. As in the "loss of
license" cases, the denial of benefits is sound, but should have been
premised on Section 402(e) because the individuals' off-duty conduct
prevented7 6 them from fulfilling one of the prerequisites of their
employment.
Similarly Section 402(e) should have been used instead of Sec-
tion 3 in cases in which individuals were incarcerated for off-duty
conduct. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has affirmed the
denial of benefits under Section 3 to an individual who was incarcer-
ated for ninety days for failure to pay child support and was subse-
reversed the denial of benefits to a driver whose license was revoked after an off-duty drunken
driving incident.
72. To be "connected with his work," the off-duty conduct must directly reflect upon the
ability of the employee to perform his assigned duties. Unemployment Compensation Board
of Review v. Derk, 24 Pa. Commw. 54, 353 A.2d 915 (1976).
73. In Township of Darby v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 59 Pa.
Commw. 284, 291,429 A.2d 1223, 1227 (1981), the claimant who had failed to obtain a driver's
license, was denied benefits by the court under Section 402(e) on the theory that "[flailure to
obtain a [Ilicense where there is a job related necessity for the license can be willful miscon-
duct." The claimant knew that a driver's license was "a necessary prerequisite" for his job as
assistant superintendent of highways. In Lytle v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Re-
view, 36 Pa. Commw. 77, 80, 387 A.2d 962, 963 (1978), the court remanded the case for a
determination "on the crucial issue of the connection between Employer's desire that Claimant
[a laborer] obtain a Pennsylvania driver's license and the job-related need for that license, if
any. "
74. Mooney v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 39 Pa. Commw. 404,
395 A.2d 675 (1978), af'dper curiam, 487 Pa. 448, 409 A.2d 854 (1980).
75. Katz v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 40 Pa. Commw. 1, 396 A.2d
480 (1979), aff'dper curiam, 487 Pa. 448, 409 A.2d 854 (1980).
76. See supra note 72 for the required causal connection between the off-duty conduct
and the employee's ability to perform his duties.
quently discharged by his employer.77 The court also denied
benefits to an individual who was incarcerated after a "drunken
brawl," remained incarcerated for over six weeks and was dis-
charged by his employer during the incarceration for "unavailability
for work due to his incarceration."7 The denial of benefits should
have been premised on Section 402(e) because the individuals' off-
duty conduct prevented then from fulfilling one of the prerequisites
of their employment.79
In D'Iorio v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review,8 0
the commonwealth court extended the Section 3 rationale to its outer
limits. The claimant, an investigator for the District Attorney's Of-
fice of Delaware County, was discharged after a partially nude pho-
tograph of him was discovered during a drug raid at the residence of
a convicted felon. The investigator was discharged because his off-
duty conduct "fell far below the demands of the position and be-
cause the investigative efficiency of the [district attorney's] office was
necessarily compromised." '
Unlike the claimants in the loss-of-license cases, the alcoholic
absenteeism cases and the absenteeism-due-to-incarceration cases,
the claimant in D'Iorio was not precluded from performing his nor-
mal job duties. The commonwealth court, however, affirmed the de-
77. Smith v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 29 Pa. Commw. 292, 370
A.2d 822 (1977). The superior court utilized the "voluntary-quit" provisions of Section 402(b)
in the strikingly similar Michalsky Unemployment Compensation Case, 163 Pa. Super. 436, 62
A.2d 113 (1948). These cases more properly belong under Section 402(e); the individual was
separated from his employment because his off-duty conduct prevented him from fulfilling one
of the prerequisites of that employment.
78. Mulqueen v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 48 Pa. Commw. 381,
383, 409 A.2d 958, 959 (1980). Claimants who are denied benefits under the availability-for-
suitable-work standard of Section 401(d) are not required to purge their disqualification under
Section 401(f) of the Law, but claimants who are denied benefits under Section 402(e) must
purge their disqualification by earning six times their weekly benefit rate. See PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43, § 801(f) (Purdon Supp. 1983).
79. In Sherman Bertram, Inc. v. California Department of Employment, 202 Cal. App.
2d 733, 739, 21 Cal. Rptr. 130, 133-34 (1962), the claimant, a paint finisher, was discharged
after being sentenced to jail for 30 days after conviction for leaving the scene of a accident, a
felony. The California unemployment compensation authorities granted benefits, but the Cal-
ifornia Court of Appeals reversed and denied benefits. The court concluded that "the claim-
ant's loss of employment was attributable to an act of his own volition and thus [was]
tantamount to a voluntary leaving."
Here claimant's unemployment was the result of his own fault - his own wilful
and felonious act in leaving the scene of an accident in which he was involved. ...
To say that claimant's wilful criminal act was not his fault and was not the cause of
his unemployment is pure sophistry. To reward claimant in such circumstances by
awarding him unemployment compensation is to reward him for idleness caused by
his wilful violation of the law - and at the expense of his employer who had nothing
whatever to do with it.
Id at 736, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 132. But see Chamberlin v. Dept. of Employment Security, 136 Vt.
571, 396 A.2d 140 (1978) in which the claimant was discharged after he was incarcerated for an
off-duty breaking and entering conviction. The Vermont Supreme Court refused to deny ben-
efits for off-duty misconduct.
80. 42 Pa. Commw. 443, 400 A.2d 1347 (1979).
81. Id at 445, 400 A.2d at 1349.
nial of benefits under Section 3 and stated as follows: "Sordid
activities and associations by law enforcement people do, as a gen-
eral proposition, constitute incompatibility with work responsibilities
within the meaning of Section 3 .182 This result must be a function of
the sensitive nature of the claimant's position. The commonwealth
court repeatedly has emphasized the demanding standards for police
officers83 and has held them to a higher standard in willful miscon-
duct cases 84 under the Unemployment Compensation Law.
B. Requirement that the Employer Discharge the Employee
Occasionally an employer will be required to discharge an em-
ployee who engages in certain off-duty conduct. This requirement
may be in a collective bargaining agreement or in a statute.
L Collective Bargaining Agreements. -In the private employ-
ment sector, union shop agreements which require a new employee
to join the union within thirty days are common.85 If a new em-
ployee fails to join the union, the employer, pursuant to the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, is required to discharge the employee.
The unemployment compensation authorities and the courts have
analyzed such cases with considerable difficulty.
82. Id at 446, 400 A.2d at 1349 (emphasis supplied). This standard differs from the
standard enunciated in Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v. Derk, 24 Pa.
Commw. 54, 353 A.2d 915 (1976). The Derk standard (direct reflection upon an employee's
ability to perform his duties) precludes the denial of benefits when the off-duty conduct only
indirectly reflects upon the employee's ability to perform his duties or merely reflects upon the
employer's perception of its own public image.
83. In Cerceo v. Borough of Darby, 3 Pa. Commw. 174, 183, 281 A.2d 251, 255 (1971),
the court stated:
We demand from our law enforcement officers, and properly so, adherence to de-
manding standards which are higher than those applied to many other professions. It
is a standard which demands more than forebearance from overt and indictable ille-
gal conduct. It demands that in both an officer's private and official lives he do noth-
ing to bring dishonor upon his noble calling and in no way contribute to a weakening
of the public confidence and trust of which he is a repository.
See also Faust v. Police Civil Service Commission, 22 Pa. Commw. 123, 347 A.2d 765 (1975).
84. In Lower Gwynedd Township v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 44
Pa. Commw. 646, 647, 404 A.2d 770, 771 (1979), the court denied benefits to a police officer.
who was suspended in December 1977 for remarking in May 1977 that "someone was going to
get hurt as he was not going to back them up if they did not discontinue harassing him." The
Board of Review had granted benefits because the claimant's supervisor had known of this
remark for seven months and had done nothing about it. The commonwealth court reversed
the grant of benefits and held the claimant, a police officer, to a higher standard than that to
which other claimants would be held.
Others who are held to a higher standard in unemployment compensation cases include
people in the health profession. See, e.g., Selan v. Unemployment Compensation Board of
Review, 495 Pa. 338, 433 A.2d 1337 (1981) (per curiam). An interesting question is whether
the unemployment compensation authorities and the courts will apply D'Iorio and its "incom-
patibility-with-work-responsibilities" standard to cases other than those involving law enforce-
ment officers.
85. Union shop agreements, however, are not permitted in the public employment sector
in Pennsylvania. See The Public Employe Relations Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.705
(Purdon Supp. 1983).
In Gulick v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review86 the
claimant, a part-time laborer with net earnings of fifty dollars per
week, was discharged after failing to pay the union's initiation fee
and one month's dues, which totalled over one hundred dollars. The
Office of Employment Security granted benefits under the voluntary-
quit section;87 the referee denied benefits under the same section; the
Board of Review denied benefits under Section 3 of the Law; the
commonwealth court affirmed under Section 3; and the supreme
court affirmedper curiam. 8 Although the Board of Review and the
courts utilized Section 3 to deny benefits, the rationale was identical
to the rationale used in Section 402(e) cases. As in the "preclusion
from performing normal job duties" cases, these individuals knew
that one of the prerequisites for their employment was union mem-
bership within thirty days. Despite such knowledge they failed to
become union members. Thus they were unemployed through their
own fault.89
2. Statutes. -Similarly a claimant may be denied unemploy-
ment benefits if a statute requires his employer to discharge him for
his off-duty conduct. The claimant's knowledge of the statute, how-
ever, may be required for denial in such cases. In Unemployment
Compensation Board of Review v. Budzanoski, 90 the claimant, a dis-
trict president and wage rate director for the United Mine Workers
of America, was convicted in federal court for violating provisions of
86. 37 Pa. Commw. 73, 388 A.2d 1154 (1978), aff'dper curiam, 487 Pa. 448, 409 A.2d 854
(1980).
87. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 802(b) (Purdon Supp. 1983).
88. 487 Pa. 448, 409 A.2d 854 (1980).
89. The commonwealth court stated as follows:
We believe the claimant had an obligation to preserve his employment by satis-
fying the condition precedent to such [continued] employment, i.e., union member-
ship, a reasonable requirement uniformly enforced among all the employes of the
company concerned. We believe that his failure to satisfy that condition resulted in
his being unemployed through his own fault.
37 Pa. Commw. at 76-77, 388 A.2d at 1156. See also McGowan Unemployment Compensa-
tion Case, 208 Pa. Super. 280, 284, 224 A.2d 647, 649 (1966), in which the Bureau of Employ-
ment Security granted benefits, the referee denied benefits under Section 402(e), the Board of
Review denied benefits under Section 402(b), but granted benefits upon remand, and the supe-
rior court denied benefits, equating a refusal to join a bona fide labor organization with "a
voluntary quit."
Another case which reflects the confusion in this area is Williams Unemployment Com-
pensation Case, 193 Pa. Super. 320, 164 A.2d 42 (1960) in which the superior court expressly
adopted the Gianfelice analysis. The court queried, (1) did the claimant cease working volun-
tarily as a matter of fact, and (2) was the claimant available for suitable work thereafter? The
answers were (i) no and (2) yes; the claimant was entitled to benefits. See also Barclay White
Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 356 Pa. 43, 50 A.2d 336 (1947), cert.
denied 332 U.S. 761 (1947); Butler Unemployment Compensation Case, 189 Pa. Super. 605,
151 A.2d 843 (1959); Wallace Unemployment Compensation Case, 187 Pa. Super. 618, 145
A.2d 902 (1958); O'Donnell Unemployment Compensation Case, 173 Pa. Super. 263, 98 A.2d
406 (1953). At issue in all these cases is the relationship between the unemployment compen-
sation law and collective bargaining agreements, especially union security provisions.
90. 21 Pa. Commw. 535, 346 A.2d 864 (1975).
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.9 '
After the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for certio-
rari, the claimant was informed by the United States Department of
Justice that, pursuant to the Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act of 1959, he was prohibited from continuing in his union
positions. The claimant then resigned his union positions92 and filed
for unemployment compensation.
As in the cases which involved the discharge of an employee
under a collective bargaining agreement for failure to pay union
dues, the unemployment compensation authorities and the common-
wealth court had difficulty analyzing the Budzanoski case. The Bu-
reau of Employment Security denied benefits under Section 402(e),
citing the claimant's willful misconduct. The referee denied benefits
under Section 402(b); the claimant voluntarily quit without a com-
pelling and necessitous reason. The Board of Review also denied
benefits under Section 402(b). The commonwealth court used Sec-
tion 3 as the primary justification for denial of benefits. After quot-
ing Section 3 and Lybarger at length, the court stated as follows:
Assuming, as the appellant insists, that the reason for his
quitting was the termination of his pay and not additional sanc-
tions for continuing to work for the unions provided by the Lan-
drum-Griffin Act, it remains impossible to conclude that his
unemployment was through no fault of his own. His pay was ter-
minated as a consequence of his misbehavior as a union officer;
his quitting of uncompensated employment was for essentially the
same cause - his own fault.
9 3
Budzanoski was the first substantive use by the commonwealth court
of Section 3.94
In Crockett v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review,95
91. 29 U.S.C. §§ 431-441 (1975).
92. The claimant's "resignations were at least partly impelled by advice of his counsel
that continuance in the jobs would cause him to be subject to criminal penalties." 21 Pa.
Commw. at 537, 346 A.2d at 865. In Gould v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Re-
view, 60 Pa. Commw. 42, 430 A.2d 731 (1981), the claimant was convicted of promoting prosti-
tution, of conspiring to promote prostitution and of conspiring to commit prostitution. Upon
the advice of her attorney, the claimant, to improve her prospects for a lenient sentence, quit
her job at the spa at which the crimes occurred. The commonwealth court, remanding the case
on a procedural technicality, stated:
In view of the fact that Gould might have received a sentence to a term of imprison-
ment of fifteen years and a $32,500 fine ... , we believe she had real and substantial
grounds for leaving her work. One who is employed by an enterprise engaged in
illegal activities as part of its usual business has a good cause for leaving such work
even if the particular employee is not required to engage in those activities.
However, it would appear that even though the claimant left her job for good
cause, she may be subject to disqualification under Section 3 because her unemploy-
ment was due to her own fault in participating in her employer's illegal business.
Id at 45-46, 430 A.2d at 732.
93. 21 Pa. Commw. at 540, 346 A.2d at 867.
94. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v. Ostrander, 21 Pa. Commw. 583,
347 A.2d 351 (1975), however, was the first case in which both the court and the Board of
Review utilized Section 3 as a substantive section.
95. 44 Pa. Commw. 50, 402 A.2d 1155 (1979).
the claimant, a civil servant, was discharged because he ran for re-
election to the school board. Section 904 of the Civil Service Act
96
prohibits political activity by a civil servant, and Section 90697 re-
quires the dismissal of civil servants who violate the Act.98 The
claimant had argued that he did not know about the prohibition in
Section 904. The Board of Review made the factual finding that the
claimant knew of the Civil Service Act's requirements. The court
declared that the finding was supported by substantial evidence and
affirmed the decision that the claimant's unemployment was not
"through no fault of his own" under Section 3.
The claimant's argument in Crockett that he did not know that
he was violating the law presents the following question: should a
claimant be denied unemployment compensation if his discharge is
the result of requirements, in a collective bargaining agreement or in
a statute, of which he is unaware? It would be difficult to argue that
a claimant's unemployment is through his own fault if the claimant
did not know, at the time of the violation of the collective bargaining
agreement or of the statute, that his conduct was a violation; the
claimant would be unaware of both the violation and the conse-
quences of the violation, his discharge.
C. Arrest or Conviction Arising from Off-Duty Conduct
When off-duty conduct precludes an employee from performing
normal job duties or triggers a statutory or contractual obligation in
an employer to discharge the employee, the unemployment compen-
sation authorities and the courts are confronted by difficult ques-
tions. Those questions, however, are better answered by Section
402(e) than by Section 3 of the Unemployment Compensation Law.
Another type of off-duty conduct case has arisen under the Unem-
ployment Compensation Law which presents an even more difficult
analytical problem - the case of a discharge resulting from arrest or
conviction for off-duty conduct. These cases cannot be analyzed
under Section 402(b) or under Section 402(e); the claimant has not
voluntarily quit his job, nor has he engaged in willful misconduct
connected with his work.
These cases arepure Section 3 cases; without using Section 3 as
a substantive provision of the Unemployment Compensation Law,
the courts could not deny benefits to the claimants. Although the
96. PA. STAT. ANN: tit. 71, § 741.904 (Purdon Supp. 1983).
97. Id. § 741.906.
98. [W]hen, after a hearing, it is proven that an employee in the classified service
(i.e., a civil servant) has engaged in the political activities prohibited by Section 904,
the penalties set forth in Section 906 must be applied, whether or not such employee
engaged in such activity intentionally or unintentionally.
Pa. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 3 (1979) (emphasis supplied). See also Pa. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 223
(1960).
unemployment compensation authorities and the commonwealth
court have utilized Section 3 in these cases, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has not yet ruled on apure Section 3 case. 99 With
difficulty the commonwealth court has groped for standards in these
cases and has gradually developed guidelines. The court occasion-
ally, however, has failed to follow its own guidelines.
The commonwealth court first faced the criminal conviction is-
sue in Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v. Ostrander. 100
The claimant, Ostrander, had pleaded guilty in federal court to con-
spiracy to violate the civil rights of another. 01 The charges against
Ostrander, a truck driver, arose out of his participation during the
independent truckers' strike of 1974 in a rock-throwing incident
which resulted in the death of another trucker. The court affirmed
the denial of benefits under Section 3 and stated that "the criminal
conviction in this case is of a sufficiently serious nature to support the
allegation that Ostrander was indeed at fault for his discharge from
work . "...,2
The court's use of a "sufficiently serious" standard was an ex-
pansion of the "moral turpitude" standard set forth in 1942 in De-
partment of Labor and Industry v. Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review. 103 The claimant had been convicted and impris-
oned for larceny which was not connected with his work. Upon re-
lease, the claimant found that he had been discharged by his
employer. The superior court premised its denial of benefits on Sec-
tion 3 and held that the legislature's declaration of public policy did
not permit the award of benefits to one who had lost his job because
he was convicted of a crime involing moral turpitude. °4
In Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v. Derk'0 5 the
commonwealth court elaborated on the "moral turpitude" standard
and on the "sufficiently serious" standard. The claimant in Derk
99. None of the seven Section 3 cases which were affirmed per curian in Smith v. Unem-
ployment Compensation Board of Review, 487 Pa. 448, 409 A.2d 854 (1980) was a "pure"
Section 3 case; each case could have been decided under Section 402(e).
100. 21 Pa. Commw. 583, 347 A.2d 351 (1975). Ostrander was the first case in which both
the commonwealth court and the Board of Review utilized Section 3 as a ubstantive section.
101. But see Giese v. Employment Division, 27 Or. App. 929, 557 P.2d 1354 (1976) in
which the claimant, a tenured professor, was discharged by Portland State University after he
was convicted in federal court of conspiring with others to explode devices designed to damage
or destroy certain federal buildings in the state. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the
grant of benefits upon the dual rationale that the claimant had not engaged in misconduct
connected with his work and that Oregon, unlike Pennsylvania, has no specific "fault"
provision.
102. 21 Pa. Commw. at 586, 347 A.2d at 352 (emphasis supplied).
103. 148 Pa. Super. 246, 24 A.2d 667 (1942).
104. The court stated: "The Declaration of Public Policy negatives the conclusion that
one who has lost his employment because of his commission of a crime involving moral turpi-
tude shall receive compensation for the unemployment which resulted from his own criminal
act." Id at 248, 24 A.2d at 668.
105. 24 Pa. Commw. 54, 353 A.2d 915 (1976).
was a part-time school bus driver who was arrested for unspecified
"morals charges" allegedly committed while off duty."co The Bureau
of Employment Security and the referee used Section 402(e) to deny
benefits, and the Board of Review achieved the same result by using
Section 3.
The court agreed with the Board of Review that Section 3 was
the proper section, but the court elaborated on the proper standards
in arrest cases:
In order to deny compensation under Section 3 of the Act, more is
needed than mere evidence of an arrest for a crime. The employer
must present some evidence showing conduct of the claimant
leading to the criminal arrest which is inconsistent with acceptable
standards of behavior and which directly reflects upon his ability
to perform his assigned duties. Of course, no proof of criminal
conviction is necessary.
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The court thus enunciated a two-part standard in arrest cases: a de-
nial of benefits may be based on off-duty conduct that (1) is inconsis-
tent with acceptable standards of behavior and (2) directly reflects
upon the claimant's ability to perform his assigned duties. The Derk
standard is more specific than the moral turpitude and sufficiently
serious standards and should be used by unemployment compensa-
tion authorities and the courts.
Significantly, the burden of satisfying the two-part test in Derk
is upon the employer. In most discharge cases arising out of an ar-
rest for off-duty conduct, the employer will have difficulty satisfying
the first prong of the Derk test unless the employer is able and will-
ing to introduce evidence of the facts which gave rise to the arrest. 08
The Derk court noted, however, that the first prong of the two-part
test would be satisfied by evidence of a conviction."°
106. See also O'Neal v. Employment Security Agency, 89 Idaho 313, 319, 404 P.2d 600,
603-04 (1965) in which the claimant, an employee of the U.S. Post Office, was discharged,
pursuant to Post Office regulations, after pleading guilty to two morals offenses committed
while off duty. Reversing the grant of benefits, the Idaho Supreme Court applied the declara-
tion of public policy in the Idaho Employment Security Law as an interpretive section and
concluded:
An employee's conduct off the working premises or outside the course or scope of his
employment is generally not considered as misconduct in connection with the em-
ployment. There are recognized circumstances, however, as where the conduct is so
closely connected with the business interests of the employer as to warrant disqualifi-
cation for unemployment benefits.
Here, however, claimant admitted violating the cited postal regulation. . . .An
employer, be he public or private, has the right to expect employees to refrain from
acts which would bring dishonor on the business name or the institution.
107. 24 Pa. Commw. at 57, 353 A.2d at 917.
108. The employer's ability to introduce such evidence will usually require cooperation
with the office of the prosecuting public official. Quite often the prosecutor will discourage the
production of such evidence, for the first time, at an unemployment compensation hearing.
109. The court stated that "[p]roof of a criminal conviction, the type of which would di-
rectly reflect on the ability of a claimant to continue in the type of position that he held, would
constitute highly persuasive, if not controlling, evidence of a violation of the restrictions of
Section 3 of the Act." 24 Pa. Commw. at 57, 353 A.2d at 917 n.2.
The commonwealth court has used Section 3 to deny benefits to
a construction inspector for the General State Authority who was
convicted of retail theft"' and to a claims manager who was con-
victed of conspiracy and mail fraud arising out of his handling of a
fraudulent automobile claim while working as a claims manager for
a prior employer.' " The court also has denied benefits to a security
officer for the Department of Environmental Resources who was
"convicted on charges of 'hit and run' in an accident occurring while
he was off duty driving his own automobile . . . and for falsifying
his accident report," ' 2 and to a clerk-typist for the Pennsylvania De-
partment of Transportation who was convicted of welfare fraud." 13
The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court in Dombroskie v. Un-
employment Compensation Board of Review 14 and Wilson v. Unem-
ployment Compensation Board of Review, 1 5 however, has failed to
apply the Derk standards and has failed to require the employer to
prove anything. Instead, the court resurrected the "moral turpitude"
standard and concluded that the claimants were ineligible as a matter
of law. The court's failure in Dombroskie and Wilson to require the
employer to satisfy the two-part Derk test and the court's willingness
to rule the claimants ineligible as a matter of law under the "moral
turpitude" standard emanates from a judicial reluctancy to provide
unemployment compensation to an individual who has been con-
victed of hit and run and of falsifying an accident report, Dombros-
kie, and to an individual who has been convicted of welfare fraud,
Wilson. The denial of benefits in Dombroskie and Wilson could not
110. Perdue v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 28 Pa. Commw. 641, 369
A.2d 1334 (1977). The claimant in Perdue testified that he felt his conviction for retail theft
would affect his job performance.
Ill. Adams v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 40 Pa. Commw. 486, 489,
397 A.2d 861, 862 (1979). The court declared "that the taint of his conviction has effectively
impugned his credibility as a representative of [the e]mployer to its insureds and as a court
witness."
112. Dombroskie v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 45 Pa. Commw.
546, 548, 405 A.2d 1044, 1045 (1979). The court did not mention Derk and relied upon the
"moral turpitude" standard: "We hold that a security officer's admission of an offense involv-
ing moral turpitude is sufficient to sustain [the] employer's burden of proving 'fault' in Section
3 cases." Id. at 550, 405 A.2d at 1046. Apparently the employer did not satisfy as a matter of
fact the second part of the Derk test; he did not produce evidence that the claimant's convic-
tion directly reflected upon his ability to perform his work duties. The court, however, resur-
rected the "moral turpitude" standard and ruled that as a matter of law the claimant was
ineligible under Section 3.
113. Wilson v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 58 Pa. Commw. 531,428
A.2d 288 (1981). The employer in Wilson did not satisfy the second part of the Derk test; he
did not produce evidence that the claimant's conviction directly reflected upon her ability to
perform her work duties. The Wilson court relied upon the "moral turpitude" standard of
Dombroskie, however, and did not mention the much more definitive Derk standards. More-
over, the Wilson court incorrectly stated that Unemployment Compensation Board of Review
v. Ostrander, 21 Pa. Commw. 583, 347 A.2d 351 (1975), the firstpure Section 3 case, was
affirmed per curiam by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Smith v. Unemployment Compen-
sation Board of Review, 487 Pa. 448, 409 A.2d 854 (1980).
114. 45 Pa. Commw. 546, 405 A.2d 1044 (1979).
115. 58 Pa. Commw. 531, 428 A.2d 288 (1981).
be based on Section 402(e), Section 402(b) or the two-part Derk stan-
dard. Moreover, the Dombroskie and Wilson approach ignores the
Derk requirement that the burden of proof in these cases be placed
on the employer.
An additional problem with the use of Section 3 in arrest and
conviction cases arises in the Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition
(ARD) program established by Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure 175-185.1 6 As the court stated in Unemployment Compensa-
tion Board of Review v. Vereen:117
Satisfactory completion of this program results in dismissal
by the court of charges against the defendant. In the instant case,
the claimant was charged with the criminal offenses of theft and
receiving stolen property, and after his satisfactory completion of
the ARD program the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
dismissed these charges.
The claimant in Vereen was accused of taking his employer's goods
without authorization. Although Section 402(e) was applicable, the
court applied Section 3 and the two-part Derk test. The employer
produced no evidence of willful misconduct, so the court reversed
the denial of benefits.
IV. Conclusion
Courts have used Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Unemployment
Compensation Law in three ways. First, consistent with the Statu-
tory Construction Act, courts have used Section 3 as an interpretive
provision, to interpret Section 401, the qualifying provisions, and
Section 402, the eligibility provisions. Second, Section 3 in the 1960s
was used as more than an interpretive section to deny unemploy-
ment compensation to employees who became unemployed under
"Share the Work" plans. Third, courts used Section 3 in the 1970s as
a substantive section to deny unemployment compensation to em-
ployees whose unemployment resulted from their off-duty conduct.
This article is designed to foster an interpretation of the Unem-
ployment Compensation Law which is more uniform and more con-
sistent with the policies underlying the law. To achieve that end the
following recommendations are offered: (1) "Share the Work" plans
in collective bargaining agreement, have been implicitly approved
by the Legislature in the 1980 amendments to the Unemployment
Compensation Law, and Section 3 and the majority opinion in
Lybarger should not be used to deny benefits to those unemployed
pursuant to such a "Share the Work" plan. (2) Before expressly ap-
proving "Share the Work" plans in the the context of unemployment
116. PA. R. CRIM. P. 175-85.
117. 29 Pa. Commw. 252, 255, 370 A.2d 1228, 1231 (1977).
compensation, however, the legislature should develop and imple-
ment methods of funding the unemployment compensation conse-
quences of "Share the Work" plans. (3) Courts and unemployment
compensation authorities should use Section 402(e) and not Section
3 in those cases in which an employee's off-duty conduct precludes
him from performing his normal job duties. (4) Similarly, Section
402(e) and not Section 3 should be used in those cases in which an
employee's off-duty conduct requires an employer, pursuant to a col-
lective bargaining agreement or a statute, to discharge the employee.
(5) Finally, if the unemployment compensation authorities and the
courts continue to use Section 3 in cases involving arrest or convic-
tion arising out of off-duty conduct, the standards set forth in Derk
should be applied.

